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Abstract: Using data from the Austrian retail gasoline market we test the following two 
hypotheses derived from spatial economics:  (i) Retail shops are more densely located in areas 
with a higher population density. (ii) Spatial competition equilibrium prices are decreasing in the 
density of seller locations. Both hypotheses are well supported by the data. Population density 
explains more than 95% of the cross-district variation in the density of gasoline stations. With 
respect to the relationship between prices and gas station density the coefficient has the 
predicted sign and is significant at the 5% level or better in all specifications. Estimation as 
simultaneous equations does not alter our conclusions, and suggests causality running from 
station density to price. 
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1. Introduction 
  Building on the seminal paper of Hotelling (1929) a large number of theoretical models 
of spatial competition have been analyzed.
1 Though the papers differ considerably with respect 
to their scope and purpose it seems fair to say that the following two questions are among the 
core issues of spatial economics: 
(i) What determines the equilibrium pattern of locations of firms? 
(ii) What are the properties of the equilibrium prices if there is spatial competition between 
firms? 
  Not surprisingly, different models come up with different results, depending on their 
main focus, but at times also on rather subtle differences in their assumptions. However, the 
following two hypotheses are supported by, or at least compatible with the vast majority of 
theoretical models: 
  Hypothesis 1: Retail shops tend to be more densely located in areas with a higher 
population density.
2 
  Hypothesis 2: With spatial competition, equilibrium prices tend to be lower the higher 
the density of seller locations is. 
  The purpose of this paper is to test both hypotheses empirically for the Austrian retail 
gasoline market. This is important for at least two reasons. First, to subject key implications of 
widely used models to empirical scrutiny is valuable per se. Second, our tests have important 
policy implications. To judge whether firms compete with each other or whether they collude, 
competition authorities need to have an idea about the notion of “competition”. That is to decide 
whether firms behave anti-competitively, they need to have a benchmark model against which to 
compare actual market conduct. The textbook model of perfect competition where price equals 
marginal costs prevails in equilibrium does not appear to be an appropriate model in markets 
                                                           
1 For surveys see e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), Beckmann and Thisse 
(1986), Martin (1993), Tirole (1988).   2
characterized by large fixed or sunk entry and exit costs, as e.g. in the retail gasoline market. 
This market, however, is characterized by a strong spatial dimension, a feature which we argue 
can be used to identify (anti-)competitive behavior. Hypothesis 2 states that provided there is 
competition between stations, the nearer they are next to each other, on average, the lower 
should be the equilibrium price they can charge. The alternative hypothesis would be no or even 
a positive relation between station density and price. No systematic relation between station 
density and price is expected if stations collude in price setting so that they effectively eliminate 
competition between them. A positive relation between station density and price might even 
result from facilitated collusion if stations are nearer to each other (e.g. if detection lags of 
deviant behavior are shorter), and/or if higher station density enables station operators to 
collectively better siphon off the additional consumer surplus that is generated by lower 
consumer transport costs. Thus, if one explicitly recognizes the spatial dimension of markets, 
identification of market conduct is possible.
3 
  We show that both of the above hypotheses are very well supported by the data. Using 
the 121 political districts of Austria as regional units we find that population density explains 
more than 95% of the cross-district variation in the density of gasoline stations. As far as the 
relationship between prices and the density of gas stations is concerned we find in all 
specifications that the coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at the 5% level or 
better. Moreover, we do not obtain different results if we estimate in a simultaneous equations 
system, nor when we choose different regional units. 
The retail gasoline market appears to be particularly apt for testing predictions of spatial 
economics for the following reasons.
4 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Hypothesis 1 may also hold in other, non-spatial models, since competitive market entry would imply a strong 
correlation between the density of suppliers and population density. 
3 Recently, the European Commission has widened the concept of dominance to also include joint, or collective, 
dominance in merger and antitrust  analysis. In our setup, a negative relation between station density and price 
would be inconsistent with collective dominance. 
4  A more detailed description of the structure of a retail gasoline market can be found in von Weizsäcker (2000).   3
-  Gasoline can be considered as an almost perfectly homogenous good with respect to its 
physical and chemical properties. 
-  As a consequence, gasoline stations are engaged in direct competition almost entirely 
only with their immediate neighbors, which agrees with most models of spatial 
competition.
5 
-  Gasoline stations cause substantial entry and exit costs, and frequently used two stage 
models with the choice of location in the first stage and (price) competition in the second 
stage capture quite well some of the crucial features of the retail gasoline market. 
-  Last, but not least, relevant data are available, particularly because prices are quite 
transparent and well documented. 
  In spite of this, to the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical test of two basic 
results of spatial economics for the retail gasoline market. There exists, however, a fair number 
of empirical studies of the gasoline market, though their focus is different from that of this 
paper. Several authors have addressed the question whether recent game theoretic models are 
compatible with observed price movements in gasoline markets, most notably M. Slade (1987, 
1992), Castanias and Johnson (1993) or Borenstein and Shepard (1996). Spatial competition, 
however, is not a main concern in these papers. Borenstein (1991)’s focus is on the determinants 
of margin differences between leaded and unleaded gasoline. Others have used data from 
gasoline markets to assess the impact of policy measures or of certain contractual arrangements 
on gasoline prices (Anderson and Johnson 1999, Johnson and Romeo 2000, Shepard 1993). An 
interesting line of research concerns the choice of contract between gas stations and their 
suppliers (Slade 1996, 1998). Finally, the demand for gasoline has been estimated by several 
authors (Schmalensee and Stoker 1999, Baltagi and Griffin 1997). Considine (2001) analyses an 
upstream market, petroleum refining. 
                                                           
5 For a recent test of the spatial dimension of competition, see Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2001). They conclude that 
competition in the wholesale gasoline market is highly localized. It appears that competition in the retail gasoline 
market is even more likely to be localized.   4
  There are a few empirical studies on spatial aspects of competition for other markets 
(Asplund and Sandin 1999, Claycombe and Mahan 1993, Fik 1988), whose focus, however, is 
different from ours. In particular, locational choice is not part of these investigations.
6 
  The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we give a brief outline of the 
theoretical rationale for the two hypotheses we are going to test. In section 3 we describe the 
data basis, and in section 4 we present our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
  Probably the best known model of spatial competition is the circle model of Salop 
(1979). See also chapter 6 of Anderson et al. (1992). This model has been modified in a number 
of ways. Capozza and van Order (1980) have made the distinction between immobile and 
portable firms, and Eaton and Wooders (1985) have analysed equilibria in models where 
relocation is prohibitively costly. The analysis becomes rather involved, and in particular the 
equilibrium cannot be expected to be unique (if one exists at all), or to require zero profits. In 
what follows therefore we focus on a description of the for us empirically relevant aspects of the 
Salop (1979) model (see the appendix for more details). 
A crucial feature of pure spatial competition is that each consumer buys at that shop 
where total costs, consisting of price times quantity plus any transport costs she has to incur are 
smallest. Consequently, each shop has a “local monopoly” whose geographical size depends on 
the prices charged by the nearest competitors and the transport costs consumers have to incur at 
different shops in a given area. The latter depend to a large extent on the distances between 
different shops, but also on the quality of the roads, the availability of public transport, etc. 
Clearly, the price a shop can charge is increasing in the distance from the nearest 
competitors and in the transport costs of consumers. The demand such a local monopoly is 
facing does not only depend on the geographical size of the market, but on the total number of 
                                                           
6 Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) focus on how the number of firms in a market relates to market size, and   5
consumers in that area and therefore, for a given area, on the population density, D. When 
choosing a location a firm wants to be where many consumers are, but only few competitors. If 
there are no entry restrictions firms will establish outlets in a region as long as the setup costs 
are smaller than the expected profits. In a more densely populated region firms can locate closer 
to each other than in thinly populated regions because demand per square kilometer is greater. 
However, the number of shops will increase less than proportional to the population density 
since the greater proximity of shops will reduce the equilibrium price. 
  In reality, additional factors may affect the location decisions of firms. Most obviously, it 
is not just the number of consumers, but also the demand per consumer which determines the 
expected profit per shop. The per capita demand, in turn, depends on the per capita income and, 
as far as the demand for gasoline is concerned, the number of cars per capita, denoted as V. 
  Another complication arises from the fact that the simplifying assumption that each firm 
has only one location is certainly not true for the retail gasoline market. Unfortunately, there is 
no straightforward answer to the question of how market concentration will affect the density of 
shops. It seems safe to say that the number of outlets a pure monopolist without entry threat will 
run is the lower bound, and the number of locations with free entry and one firm per location is 
the upper bound for the number of shops. Beyond that we have no clear prediction concerning 
the relationship between market concentration and density of gasoline stations. 
  Finally, it is worth mentioning that even the retail gasoline market does not fully 
conform to pure spatial competition. Some consumers have a preference for particular brands, 
and gas stations compete not only via prices, but also by offering special services, running 
shops, etc. It is hard to tell, however, how effective these additional strategic variables actually 
are, and as far as our empirical analysis is concerned we do not have reliable data to test their 
impact. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
thereby infer how market power relates to the number firms.   6
  Denoting some measure of market concentration as C, the above discussion on the 
determinants of the density of gasoline stations can be summarized by the following equation 
and partial derivatives 
 
  S = S(D, V, T, C,...),          ( 1 )  
 
∂S/∂D > 0 
∂ 
2S/∂D
2 < 0 
∂S/∂V > 0 
∂
2S/∂V
2 < 0 
∂S/∂T > 0 
∂S/∂C = ?. 
 
  That is, we expect the demand variables D and V to positively affect station density. 
Since larger station density implies increased competition and thus lower equilibrium prices, this 
relation is expected to be concave. Consumer transport costs T increase station density. The 
question mark for the partial derivative of market concentration C captures the ambiguity of 
predictions. 
  Consider next the equilibrium price for given locations of shops. As argued above, prices 
can be expected to be increasing in the distances between shops and increasing in the transport 
costs of consumers. In our empirical analysis we use S, the density of shops, as an (inverse) 
proxy for these distances. Furthermore, equilibrium prices are increasing in marginal costs, 
denoted as c. 
  An interesting question concerns the impact of market concentration on the retail price. 
We would expect prices to be increasing in the degree of concentration for at least two reasons: 
a)  If a firm is able to set up a cluster of outlets such that some of her shops have only shops 
run by herself as nearest “competitors” then these shops are protected from outside 
competition and can charge a higher price than with pure spatial competition. 
b)  In highly concentrated markets tacit collusion is more likely to occur than in markets 
with many competitors.   7
However, concentration may simply proxy for the efficiency of firms and lower marginal 
costs of some firms which lead to lower retail prices. Thus, we again do not make strong 
predictions as to the effects of concentration. 
To sum up, the price equation and partial derivatives can be written as 
 
  P = P(S, T, c, C,....)         ( 2 )  
 
∂P/∂S < 0 
∂P/∂T > 0 
∂P/∂c > 0 
∂P/∂C=?. 
 
With spatial competition, we expect a higher station density S to reduce equilibrium 
price. As already mentioned in the introduction, the alternative hypothesis would be no or even a 
positive relation between station density and price, if stations collude in price setting so that they 
effectively eliminate competition between them. Larger consumer transport costs T and larger 
marginal costs c increase price. Again, expectations are ambiguous concerning the effects of 
market concentration C on price. 
  In (1) and (2) we have assumed that entry decisions preceed price competition, that is 
that station density is a predetermined variable with respect to price. We will, however, test 
whether S and P are simultaneously determined by estimating (1) and (2) as simultaneous 
equations below. 
 
3. The Data 
To test the predictions of spatial competition as outlined in section 2, we first assembled 
a comprehensive list of gasoline stations in Austria as of the beginning of 2001. Unfortunately, 
there does not exist a comprehensive list of stations from a single source, therefore we had to 
construct a list from the sources Statistik Austria (Austrian Statistical Office), the ÖAMTC (an 
Austrian automobile club), and information provided by the petroleum companies (in the order   8
of their market shares) OMV AG, BP Austria AG, SHELL, ESSO, AGIP and ARAL. Thus, we 
could localize 2,856 gasoline stations in Austria by address (zip code and address). Additionally, 
we know the name of the oil company operating the stations or whether the station is operated 
by an independent retailer. According to the Fachverband der Mineralölindustrie (Association 
of the Petroleum Industry in Austria), there were 2,957 operating gasoline stations in Austria as 
of the beginning of 2001, thus our list covers 96.6% of all gasoline stations in Austria.  
Therefore, we are confident that our derived measures as e.g. market concentration are accurate. 
We further believe that the number of gasoline stations rather than output or sales is the right 
measure to calculate concentration figures in our context, because what is important for a 
consumer is that she potentially can buy gasoline from a competing station. Thus it is important 
that a given station has some idle capacity. This is almost always the case. 
For 1,603 (54.2%) gasoline stations operated by the firms OMV AG, BP Austria AG, 
SHELL, AGIP and ARAL we obtained retail price information on a daily basis for the period 1 
November 2000 until 30 March 2001 for the gasoline brand EUROSUPER (unleaded gasoline 
containing 95 Octane), which is the most important brand in Austria. This implies that we do not 
have price information on independent retailers. We partially correct for any biases by including 
the percentage of stations operated by independent retailers in the pricing regressions presented 
in section 4. 
A rather tricky problem is the delineation of local gasoline markets and the definition of 
“regions”. Austria consists of nine federal states subdivided into 121 districts, which consist of 
roughly 2,400 municipalities (i.e. zipcode level). We use the districts as relevant regions. This 
choice compromises on the market definition being too narrow (as is probably the case if we 
take zip codes or the like as our region) or too wide (if we took e.g. federal states).
7  Note, 
however, to the extent that we measure the relevant market inaccurately, our estimates are likely 
to underestimate the true relationships. Unless the inaccuracy is correlated with our variables of   9
interest, the most likely effect is increased white noise reducing statistical significance. In any 
case, we present robustness tests using the narrow market definition at the zipcode level. 
For each of the 121 districts, we calculate the variables as defined in Table 1. The dependent 
variables are margin M and the density of gasoline stations S in a particular district, with M = P 
- c. P is the daily retail price charged for EUROSUPER net of all taxes (a 20% sales tax and a 
gasoline quantity tax of 5.61 ATS/liter) in ATS per liter averaged over the period 1 November 
2000 and 31 March 2001 and averaged over all stations within a district. To obtain estimates of 
marginal cost c we utilize information on PLATT product notations in Amsterdam. The market 
in Amsterdam and more generally the "ARA area" (Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp) is the most 
important spot market determining gasoline prices in Europe. More than 14% of European 
refinery capacity and most of European petroleum imports are located in this area (Puwein and 
Wüger, 1999). Our strategy to proxy marginal costs for Austrian gasoline stations is therefore to 
apply a limit pricing argument in that marginal costs are equal to these PLATT prices plus 
transportation costs (to and within Austria) and variable remuneration of gasoline operators. 
Specifically, marginal cost c is proxied by the sum of (1) the average daily PLATT price 
of EUROSUPER in Rotterdam over the period 1 November 2000 and 31 March 2001 converted 
to ATS from USD using daily exchange rates (which equalled 3.01 ATS/liter), (2) estimates of 
transportation costs to Austria per liter (0.20 ATS/liter; Source.: Puwein and Wüger, 1999), (3) 
estimates of distribution costs within Austria per liter (0.10 ATS/liter; Source: Puwein and 
Wüger, 1999), and (4) estimates of the per liter remuneration of service station operators (0.30 
ATS/liter, Source: Fachverband der Mineralölindustrie). Therefore, we estimate marginal costs 
c at 3.61 ATS/liter over the period of analysis. This strikes us to be the most plausible estimate 
of marginal costs. We experimented with a number of values ranging from 3 to 4 ATS/liter, 
however the results for the margin equation in section 4 are virtually the same. Additionally, we 
include 8 federal state dummies in addition to the constant term in the margin equation below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Defining the relevant market is beyond the scope of this paper. See Slade (1986) for such an attempt.   10
Fixed federal state effects may arise due to differing distribution and remuneration costs and 
thus differing marginal costs within Austria. 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of average P (net of all taxes) in Austria and the PLATT 
notations for EUROSUPER as well as BRENT crude oil in Rotterdam. As can be seen, retail 
prices first decrease until around mid of January 2001, increase until mid of February and then 
remain roughly constant. PLATT notations are a bit more volatile than retail prices in Austria 
(coefficient of variation of 0.10 for EUROSUPER and 0.15 for BRENT versus 0.07 for average 
retail prices in Austria). Therefore, we are confident that the time period is long enough and the 
turbulence in the markets was sufficiently low so that we capture structural differences in M 
across districts and not merely short-run disequilibrium phenomena. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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  Table 1 presents detailed definitions of the variables used in the subsequent regression 
analysis. Table 2 presents summary statistics. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
On average, districts extend to around 700 sqkm with nearly 70,000 inhabitants. An average of 
5.6 firms operate 23.7 gasoline stations per district. The mean before tax price of a liter of 
EUROSUPER was 5.07 ATS with a quite sizeable range of 4.66 to 5.40 across districts. The 
average margin is 1.46 ATS. On average, the patch of a service station is 31.6 sqkm (=1/S) and 
the median population density is 87.3 inhabitants per sqkm. The largest firm on average operates 
more than a quarter of gasoline stations, average C4 is 65.1% and the average HERF is 16.1%. 
Around a third of gasoline stations are operated by independent marketers. The degree of 
motorization V varies considerably across districts with a mean of 0.72 motorized vehicles per 
person and a maximum of more than two. Nearly 40% of the area is alpine or covered with 
woods. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Results 
This section presents our results in two steps. First, we explain the density of gasoline 
stations. These regressions give insight into the determinants of entry into the Austrian retail 
market of gasoline. From section 2 we hypothesize that the main determinants of the density of 
gasoline stations are population density and the degree of motorization as proxies of demand, 
and market concentration. Second, we present the results on the price equation. Here the main 
theoretical prediction is that the price is decreasing in station density (or increasing in the 
average distance between gasoline stations). Controls include the share of independent 
marketers and additional proxies of transport costs. 
 
   12
4.1. The density of gasoline stations 




  01 2 ln kk k k SD E M A N D C aa a e =+ + +         ( 3 )  
 
where  k= 1 . . . 121 denotes administrative districts in Austria; ln k S  the (logarithm of 
the) number of gasoline stations per sqkm in district k;  {} ln ,ln kk k DEMAND D V =  the (logarithms 
of the) number of inhabitants per sqkm in district k as well as the number of motorized vehicles 
per capita in district k;  {} ln 1 ln 4 ln kk k k CC o r C o r H E R F =  the (logarithms of the) share of the 
largest, the largest four firms or the Herfindahl-index in district k; and  k e  an error term. 
Table 3 presents the results. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As theory would predict population density virtually completely determines the density of 
gasoline stations. Population density explains more than 95% of the cross-district variation in 
the density of gasoline stations. Figure 2 shows that the fit is nearly perfect. 
The coefficient estimate of 0.81 (t = 41.10) implies that for each one percentage increase 
in the number of inhabitants per sqkm the number of gasoline stations increases by around 0.8 
percent per sqkm. This conforms to predictions of models of spatial competition that the number 
of outlets increases less than proportional to consumer density, since the greater proximity of 
shops reduces the equilibrium price. 
  Equation 2 of Table 3 includes 0-1 dummies for federal districts of which there are nine 
in Austria. Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of these dummies and the coefficient on lnD 
rises to 0.90 with a t-value of 17.77. The F-statistic indicates that fixed federal state effects are   13
not significant at conventional levels thus we leave them out in equations 3 to 7. We will return 
to fixed federal state effects when we analyze the margin equation, however. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
















Population density is fairly skewed across districts due to the presence of cities, most 
notably the City of Vienna. It may be the case that entry decisions are influenced by quite 
different factors in cities than in the countryside e.g. by the availability of space etc. Therefore 
we test for the robustness of our results by excluding the 23 districts of Vienna. Equation 3 
shows that results are unaltered and the influence of population density is virtually the same in 
Vienna than in other administrative districts. When we restrict the sample to those districts 
where population density is smaller than 500 inhabitants per sqkm (and thus effectively 
restricting the sample to the 90 mostly rural districts), the coefficient rises to 0.90 (t = 12.70). 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 We tried  k ALPS  in (3) as a proxy for consumer transport costs T. Since this variable was always insignificant   14
Thus, there is some evidence that entry decisions in rural areas depend even more on population 
density than entry decisions in more densely populated areas. 
Equations 4 to 6 add our measures of market concentration to the estimating equation. 
Recall our measures of market concentration are based on the relative size of firms in the market 
as measured by the number of gasoline stations operated by them. The logarithm of the share of 
the largest firm lnC1 has the expected negative sign but is insignificant while a larger C4 and 
Herfindahl-index significantly reduce station density. 
Equation 7 adds the variable lnV, another proxy for demand, which takes on the expected 
positive sign and is marginally significant at the 5% level. 
We chose to present the results on the log-log specification (3) since R²'s were highest. It 
should be noted, however, that our results do not depend on the specific functional form chosen. 
We experimented with a number of different functional forms and specifications, e.g. the linear 
model, the linear model including squared terms, or explicitly estimating a power function by 
non-linear least squares. None of our results changes and the results from these regressions are 
available upon request. In particular, all estimations produce a similar concave relationship 
between S and D. This can be interpreted as an additional specification test of equation (1). 
 
4.2. The margin equation 
  The second main prediction of models of spatial competition concerns the relationship 
between the price and therefore the margin that is charged and competition intensity as implied 
by the distance to the closest competitors: the farther away gasoline stations are from one 
another on average the higher will be the margin charged.
9 Thus, we operationalize equation (2) 
and estimate 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
and its inclusion never changed the results on the other variables, we do not report it. 
9 We report the results on retail margins rather than markups as Borenstein (1991) does. It should be noted, 
however, that the results are similar if we take markup as the dependent variable in (4).   15
  01 2 3 4 ln ln( ) ln kk k k k k k M P c S C ALPS INDEPENDENT b bb b b n =- = + + + + +  (4) 
 
where k = 1 . . . 121 again denotes administrative districts in Austria; ln ln( ) kk M Pc =-  
the (logarithm of the) average price charged in district k minus our estimate of marginal cost; 
lnS  the (logarithm of the) number of gasoline station per sqkm in district k. This is an inverse 
proxy of the average distance between gasoline stations. A larger value of S therefore indicates 
more intense competition, and we expect  1 0 b <  if spatial competition plays a role in the 
determination of margins.  { } ln ln 1 ln 4 ln kk k k CC o r C o r H E R F =  is the (logarithms of the) share 
of the largest, the largest four firms or the Herfindahl-index in district k;  k ALPS  the share of alps 
and woods of total area in district k as an additional proxy for differing transport costs across 
districts; and  k n  is an error term. As already mentioned, we do not have price data on 
independent retailers, thus we include  k INDEPENDENT , the share of independent marketers in 
district k, to correct for possible biases. 
Table 4 presents the results on equation (4). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In all specifications the coefficient on lnS is negative and significant at the 5% level or better 
indicating that the closer competitors on average are to each other the lower is the margin. The 
margin equations indicate that – contrary to the gasoline density equation before – fixed federal 
state effects are significant and explain a fair portion of the cross sectional variation in margins. 
The inclusion of these dummies does not render lnS insignificant, on the contrary, coefficients 
and significance levels rise. One explanation is that our measure of marginal cost which we 
assumed invariant across districts and thus federal states in fact varies across them, e.g. due to 
differing distribution and remuneration costs. The fixed federal states effects correct for this. 
Equations 1 to 3 include (respectively) lnC1, lnC4 and lnHERF as explanatory variables, 
however, we do not detect a significant influence of market concentration on the margin at the   16
district level. INDEPENDENT takes on negative signs, however, it is only significant when we 
restrict the sample to the 98 districts outside of Vienna (see equation 5). 
As we have seen in section 4.1. gasoline station density in an area is determined by 
demand and cost conditions in a particular market. Equation 4 estimates (4) by 2SLS 
instrumenting lnS by lnD. The results do not change and if anything the influence of lnS is larger 
if we instrument it. We also performed Hausman tests, which showed that endogeneity is not a 
likely problem, since the coefficients obtained with the less efficient but consistent estimates are 
not systematically different from the fully efficient estimates, i.e. c2 10 5 7 () . = . As a final check 
against endogeneity, we shall estimate (3) and (4) simultaneously below. 
  ALPS, the area share of alps and woods as an additional proxy for transport costs, takes 
on the right signs, however it is not significant. One explanation is that S is highly correlated 
with ALPS (correlation coefficient of 0.72) and S is the dominant force explaining margins. This 
is confirmed by the fact that when we exclude lnS, ALPS takes on positive and significant 
coefficients. 
 
4.3. Additional robustness tests 
  Until now we assumed that districts are accurate in defining the relevant region for 
gasoline stations. We now test whether our results are changed if we narrow our definition of the 
relevant region. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results on the margin equation at the zipcode 
level.
10 That is, all variables are now defined at the narrow level of municipalities. There are 
2,383 municipalities in Austria. Of these, 1,173 do have gasoline stations. We have all the 
relevant data for 803 zipcode areas. On average, there are 2.4 stations per zipcode area and 
provided there is a station the range is 1 to 46 stations. Thus this market definition is very 
narrow. 
                                                           
10 We also analysed equation (3) at the zipcode level. Results are very much the same as obtained at the district 
level.   17
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  As can be inferred from Panel A in Table 5, our results are robust to this change in 
market definition. Again, 2SLS estimates and restricting the sample to zipcodes outside of 
Vienna increases the estimated influence of lnS on the margin, consistent with prior reasoning. 
The measures of market concentration take on a positive sign and - with the exception of C1 - 
are significant at the 5% level or better. The share of independent marketers decreases the 
margin that can be charged and the area share of alps and woods as a measure of transport costs 
increases the margin. These estimates imply that the operational definition of market boundaries 
does not change our results, with the possible exception of the influence of market 
concentration. 
A few words seem in order to explain the validity of our distance measure S. S is a good 
(inverse) proxy for the average distance between gasoline stations if stations do not cluster in 
one spot in each market. That is, if entry decisions are taken as suggested by models of spatial 
competition under subsequent price competition (maximum differentiation), stations optimally 
locate as far away from each other as possible and S is an appropriate distance measure.
11 If 
stations do cluster, on the other hand, station density S may vary cross sectionally without 
changing the average distance between stations by much. We therefore need to assess whether 
clustering of gasoline stations is a problem. Figure 3 presents a frequency distribution of the 
number of stations per zipcode. In 681 or 58.1% of the 1,173 zipcodes with stations, there is 
only one station. In 85.8% of the zipcodes, there are three or fewer stations, in only 31 zipcode 
areas, there are more than 10 stations.  This overwhelmingly suggests that clustering of stations 
does not occur on average, and thus that S is an appropriate measure of distance. Our distance 
measure S should work best in zipcodes with only one station. If we restrict the sample to those 
681 zipcodes with only one station, and estimate a regression like in equation 4 of Panel A in 
                                                           
11 In the symmetric circle model of Salop (1979) with consumers being uniformly distributed, stations are equi-
spaced around the circle in equilibrium.   18
Table 5 by 2SLS, the coefficient and significance of ln z S  remain virtually unchanged (–0.025, z 
= –2.88). This again suggests that S is an appropriate measure of distance. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 






















  In Table 4 we effectively allowed marginal costs to vary across the nine federal states in 
Austria by including fixed federal state effects which were highly significant. Although we 
additionally allowed for ALPS to influence marginal costs, it may be that marginal costs vary 
across districts in ways we did not control for yet. For example, there may be some districts 
where road availability or quality is worse than in others even in the same federal state or given 
ALPS, and thus transport costs are higher. If we introduce 120 district dummies in addition to 
the constant term and estimate an equation like 4 in Panel A of Table 5 by 2SLS, the F-test on 
the fixed district effects is 8.30 indicating significance beyond the 1% level. The results on the 
other variables, however, remain unchanged. In particular, the coefficient on ln z S  rises to –
0.031 (z = –3.21).This suggests that differential marginal costs at the district level are not 
responsible for our main findings.   19
  Thus far we have assumed that station density is a predetermined variable with respect to 
price. Equilibrium price and density of stations, however, may be jointly determined. Higher 
equilibrium price and therefore margins should lure gasoline operators to enter the market, while 
higher station density should depress equilibrium price. We have already presented 2SLS 
estimations, however, these do not explicitly take into account that the entry and pricing 
decisions may be taken simultaneously. As a final test of robustness, therefore, we test whether 
our results hold up if we estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously by the full-information 
method 3SLS. All dependent variables are now explicitly endogenous to the system and as such 
are treated as correlated with the disturbances in the system's equations. 
  Panel B in Table 5 presents the results. We present the results for the district level as the 
definition of the relevant region. Our results on both equations are not altered if we treat 
equilibrium margin and density of gasoline stations as jointly determined variables. While ln k M  
takes on the expected positive coefficient in the density equation, the coefficient is insignificant 
and does not alter the influence of the demand and concentration variables. The coefficient on 
ln k S  remains negative and significant beyond the 1% level in the margin equation, even after 




  We have shown that the Austrian retail gasoline market conforms quite well to the main 
predictions of spatial competition models. That is, the density of stations is almost completely 
determined by population density, whereas the equilibrium price is lower if competitors are 
nearer. Estimation as simultaneous equations confirms that causality runs from station density to 
price. These results suggest that competition between gasoline stations is an important element 
in market conduct.   20
  We have also found that market concentration reduces the density of stations in a given 
region, however, we could not establish a consistent relationship of concentration and price. It 
appears that the main effects of concentration are on the entry decisions rather than on the 
pricing decisions. 
  Our results suggest that spatial competition is an appropriate benchmark for judging the 
intensity (or lack thereof) of competition in the retail gasoline market. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that competition in the retail gasoline market is not as simple as the basic model of 
spatial competition would have it. The price setting mechanism in reality may be quite intricate. 
In particular, prices are in general not set by individual gas stations. Stations can be owned and 
operated by the big companies directly, they can be owned and operated by independent dealers, 
and in between several combinations of these two extremes are possible. These refinements are 
certainly fruitful areas of future research.   21
Appendix 
  In order to illustrate equations (1) and (2) in the main text, we use the model of spatial 
competition of Salop (1979). The following summary is borrowed from chapter 6 of Anderson et 
al. (1992), where further details can be found.  
  Assume that there is a continuum of consumers with measure N. They are uniformly 
distributed around a circle of circumference L, with density N/L. Each consumer buys one unit 
of the good at that shop where her total costs are smallest. Denote the location of consumer j as 
Zj, and the location of shop i as zi. The transport costs are given by 
 
 T ji = τ Zj - zi 
β         ( A 1 )  
 
where Zj - zi is the length of the shortest arc linking Zj and zi on the circle, and  τ and β 
are strictly positive parameters, with β ≥ 1. Now suppose there are n identical shops which are 
equi-spaced around the circle, hence the distance between two successive shops equals L/n. 
Finally, denote the marginal costs of each shop as c. It can be shown that in a symmetric 
equilibrium the price is given by 
 
 P*  =  c  + β 2
1-β τ (n/L) 
-β.         ( A 2 )  
  
Note that n/L corresponds to S, the density of gasoline stations, in the general case 
discussed in section 2. Obviously, (A2) is a special case of (2). 
  Denoting the fixed entry costs as K the equilibrium profit π* can be written as a function 
of the number of firms. 
 
  π*(n) = N β 2
1-β τ L
β n
-β-1 - K        ( A 3 )    22
 
  In the complete model entry decisions take place in the first stage and price competition 
takes place in the second stage. It is assumed that relocation of shops is costless, and it can be 
shown that in equilibrium shops will be equi-spaced as has been assumed above. Entry takes 
place as long as (A3) remains non-negative if an additional firm enters the market. The 
equilibrium number of firms per unit of distance is given by 
 
 n
e/L =  
1






        ( A 4 )  
 
Note again that N/L corresponds to the population density D in (1). Clearly, (A4) can be 
considered as a special case of (1). 
   23
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